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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CHRISTOPHER and RUTH 
CHRISTOPHER, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., FORD 
MARKETING CORPORATION, and 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND LOAN 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
-vs-
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., 
Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
•vs-
CONDOR COACH CORPORATION, 
Third Party Defendant, 
Case No. 14063 
DEFENDANT-THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant and appellant, Larson Ford, respectfully 
petitions this Court for a rehearing on the following grounds: 
1. The Court's holding on the submission of the claim 
of v/arranty of merchantibility to the jury is completely contrary 
to the principles of the cases cited in the opinion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The opinion ignores any factual analysis of fraud 
when in fact no material statement of fact made by the defendant, 
Larson Ford, was untrue, nor did it know or have reason to know 
that it was untrue. 
3. The opinion first refuses to allow Larson Ford 
to exclude warranty of merchantibility because the exclusion 
clause was not called to the attention of the Christophers, then 
inconsistently allows the third party defendant, Condor, to 
limit warranties by a document never called to the attention of 
Larson. 
4. The opinion upheld a dismissal of Larson's Third 
Party Complaint without submitting any questions of fact to the 
jury when substantial questions of fact existed. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was an appeal by Larson Ford, an automobile dealer, 
from a jury verdict on a Complaint in fraud and breach of warranty 
of fitness for a particular use of a motor home sold to plaintiff 
and from a dismissal of a Third Party Claim by Larson over 
against the manufacturer of said motor home. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
This Court affirmed the Trial Court.. 
-2-
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v
 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as they appear from the record are as follows: 
The plaintiff, John Christopher, and his son, Robin, 
had been looking for a motor home for several days, had looked • 
at various brands of motor homes (R. 443, L. 2-4), and saw the 
subject unit on May 9, 1972, while driving by Larson Ford and 
stopped to look at this unit (R. 395 and 396). At that time, 
the Christophers had a conversation with Jon Larson, a salesman 
working for Larson Ford, telling Mr. Larson that they needed a 
unit which would have room for ten boys and pull another 
machine or car, and were assured by Mr. Larson that it would, 
and further, Larson told Christopher the name of a man who 
had a Condor which was an identical unit, who pulled a big 
horse trailer with four horses in it and had no problem. 
Christopher didn't talk to this person (R. 397, L. 22-28). 
Christopher, at this time, also noted the subject unit had 
over 7,000 miles on it, and in response to this, was told 
by Larson that the unit was a demonstrator and had a new 
motor in it, because the original motor had "blown upn at 
Bakersfield, California (R. 390, L. 6-14). After that, 
Robin, the son, looked around for other motor homes, and had 
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looked at another motor home, but the price was $21,000.00 
to $23,000.00 (R. 557), and the plaintiff told Robin to 
make Larson an offer less than the asking price to "feel him 
(Larson) out" (R. 399, L. 9-23). At no time had either Robin 
or his father taken demonstration rides in any other motor homes 
to see how they performed (R. 557 and 558) , nor was there any 
testimony adduced by the plaintiff as to how other motor homes 
performed. . . . « , 
Financing was arranged through Murray First Thrift 
and Exhibit 4-P, a vehicle buyer's order, 9-P, a conditional sales 
contract, and 11-P (R. 431 and 432) were signed by the plaintiff 
on May 13, 1972, as documents of sale. 
Paragraph 17 of Exhibit 9-P provides as follows: 
"NO REPRESENTATION, PROMISE OR WARRANTY, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED HAS BEEN MADE WITH 
RESPECT TO THE MERCHANTABILITY, SUITABILITY 
OR FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OF THE PROPERTY 
OR OTHERWISE UNLESS THE SAME IS ENDORSED 
HEREON IN WRITING OR IS CONTAINED IN A 
SEPARATE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY . 
THE ORIGINAL SELLER." 
Christopher first drove the vehicle on May 18th or 19th (R. 406, 
L. 23). It did not have a trailer hitch on it (R. 444), and 
after Robin Christopher purchased a trailer hitch (R. 504) and 
mounted the same upon the motor home with the help of personnel 
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from Larson Ford (R. 444, L. 21-27 and 504, L. 11-17), the 
plaintiff and his son drove the vehicle, towing a van owned by 
Robin, up Parley's Canyon and return. Thereafter, Christopher 
made the final payment of $975.00 upon the contract and Jon 
Larson issued Exhibit 3-P, which gave the plaintiffs the balance 
of the Ford Warranty on the unit. Neither the plaintiff nor his 
son determined the weight of the Condor, the van, or the load 
either carried, nor did they insist on any test drive of the 
vehicle before the plaintiffs signed Exhibits 4-P, 9-P and 
i i - p . ...'• "",'• ' ; - : ^ ; 
Thereafter, Robin Christopher, 18-year-old son of the 
plaintiffs, left Salt Lake City, with the motor home loaded 
with eight mentally retarded patients of the American Fork 
Training School who weighed about 140 pounds each (R. 519), 
their luggage and towing a Ford Econoline Van loaded with 
merchandise for San Jose, California, intending to make such 
a trip in one day (R. 518, L. 25), a distance of 780 miles 
(R. 549). In fact, he made it beyond Reno, Nevada, to a point 
some 50 to 70 miles into California the first day. 
On this trip and travels after that, Robin claimed that 
the unit would pull down to five miles per hour on hills although 
-5-
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it ran at speeds of 50 to 60 miles per hour on level and downhill 
stretches (R. 518 and 519), the generator which ran the internal 
electrical system wouldn't support electrical cooking units so 
Christopher cooked on a gas stove in the unit (R. 520),. although 
a repairman in Oregon operated the generator easily (R. 524). 
Sometimes, Robin would have to wiggle the shifting lever to 
get the starter to engage (R. 522). At one point in Seattle, 
Washington, the motor home with ten boys, their baggage, food 
and merchandise, and the van on behind, would not pull up a 
hill and Robin had to have one of the boys get in the van and 
help the motor home over the hill. On the way back from 
Seattle to Sacramento, California, the automatic transmission 
would occasionally shift by itself from third gear to second 
gear while going downhill (R. 530). During this time, the 
motor home was never taken to a Ford dealer for any adjustments 
pursuant to Exhibit 3~P, but was driven to Sacramento, whereupon 
Robin loaded all of the boys into his van and drove to Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Robin and his father went to Larson Ford 
and told Jon Larson about these various problems and were 
told to bring the motor home back to Salt Lake City and Larson 
would repair any problems on it (R. 533) . Robin then returned 
to Sacramento and drove the unit as far as Reno, Nevada, where 
-6-
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It would not start, for an unknown reason, whereupon Robin 
took a bus back to Salt Lake City, Utah. Larson Ford arranged 
for the unit to be taken to a Ford dealer in Reno and the 
transmission was repaired under a warranty of Ford Marketing 
Company and now works satisfactorily (R. 565). The plaintiff, 
after driving the motor home back to Salt Lake City, came into 
Larson Ford and insisted that Larson take the unit back and 
refund his money (R. 428 and 429). -
The plaintiff then took the motor home to a Mr. William 
W. Has lam, a bus mechanic, who testified that the solenoid 
which operates the starting system on the motor of the unit 
was mounted on the frame three-to-three-and-one-half inches 
from the exhause manifold and the heat from the exhause ^ 
manifold caused a breakdown in the wiring inside the solenoid 
and caused failure of the starting system which could be cured 
by moving the solenoid further from the manifold (R. 610), and 
further that the fuel supply line for the motor which runs 
an auxiliary generator was installed cross-threaded, causing 
the motor to receive air rather than fuel through the fuel 
line (R. 611), which was cured by properly tightening the 
lines, then found that the fuel line was too short to pick 
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up the fuel when the fuel level was below one-half of a tank 
(R. 612 and 613). Further, it was Haslam's opinion, admitted 
over objections by all of the defendants as to lack of 
qualification of the witness and improper foundation, that 
the power train design was too small for the load it was to 
carry, and further that when Haslam turned the air cleaner 
cover on the motor over, the motor was better able to handle 
the load, and further, it was Haslam1s opinion that the air 
supply to the engine was restricted because of design (R. 621 
and 622), and further that a howl in the driveline complained 
of by Christopher was a result of a mismatch of gears and 
further, that the motor, transmission driveline and differential 
were too small to handle this particular size of motor home 
<R. 624). However, the motor had adequate compression according 
to Haslam's tests (R. 638 and 639). 
An expert with respect to the ability of a given chassis 
to climb a given grade with a load was called by the defendant, 
Larson Ford, Donald F. Lee, testified that various factors 
influenced the ability of any automobile or truck to climb a 
hill, but that the absolute maximum speed that the particular 
chassis in the plaintiffs1 vehicle could attain going up a six 
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percent (6%) grade with a gross combined vehicle weight of 
19,200 pounds would be 12 miles per hour (R. 836) with the wind, 
temperature conditions and air pressure all operating to lower 
this speed (R. 841). 
The unit in question was manufactured by Condor and 
purchased by Larson as an authorized Condor Coach dealer from 
Condor Coach Corporation on August 5, 1970. Exhibit 25-DC which 
was contained in a large operator's manual which was presumably 
in a drawer within the motor home for which Larson Ford signed 
a receipt, exhibit 24-DC (P. 857). Exhibit-25-DC, entitled 
"Warranty" provided that in order for it to be in effect the 
Condor Coach be purchased from or delivered through an authorized 
Condor Coach dealer and provided that the Condor Coach body 
and the installation of component parts were warranted to be 
free from any substantial defects for twelve (12) months after 
the date of delivery to such purchaser or until it was driven 
12,000 miles, whichever occurs first. There were no documents 
of sale between Condor and Larson Ford as it was a cash transaction. 
Because of a defect in the interior panelling, the unit 
was driven back to El Monte, California, and the interior was 
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replaced by Condor under its warranty, then on the way back from 
El Monte, California, the engine failed (R. 860) and was replaced . 
under the Ford warranty (R. 861). The vehicle was returned to 
Salt Lake City, Utah, by Park Larson and sat on Larson's lot 
until the Christophers purchased the vehicle in May of 1972, 
There was no evidence of any changes made mechanically in the 
motor home during the time that Larson Ford had it, except the 
replacement of the motor under the Ford warranty. ..,.,-. . - •• - . .* 
v At the time that Larson Ford was sued by the Christophers 
in this matter, Park Larson, the president of Larson Ford 
contacted Condor and informed them of the lawsuit _ (5U 861 and . 
862), and also there was a conversation after the lawsuit began 
with Condor's personnel regarding the nature of the claim (R. 865)• 
It was stipulated between Larson and Condor that the 
evidence of the Christophers of breach of warranty could be 
considered as evidence of breach of warranty alleged by Larson 
against Condor (R. 868 and 869). However, with respect to 
those defects, Condorfs president, Mr. Kieffer, testified that 
if the solenoid was mounted too close to the exhaust manifold 
on this unit and such a location caused solenoid failure, that 
he would have had 400 other claims (R. 890) and that a certain 
amount of driveline howl is usual, and if it is abnormal it 
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could be repaired, also that the odometer for the generator 
on the unit showed that the generator which Christopher claimed 
would not run showed that the generator had run 352 hours (R. 893). 
Further, Mr. Kieffer testified that this particular unit, if it 
were not abused could and would pull a 4000 pound trailer (R. 898) 
and that he personally pulls a jeep behind his own Condor motor 
home to the mountains of Colorado (R. 879). 
ARGUMENT , 
i ' ' I • ' 
PLEADINGS AND SUBMISSION OF ISSUE OF MERCHANTIBILITY 
TO THE JURY. 
As to the issue of whether or not the Trial Court should 
have allowed the theory of breach of warranty of merchantibility 
to go to the jury when it was not pleaded in plaintiff's Complaint, 
the opinion of this Court makes the following statement: 
"But it is also held that if the issue is 
actually tried, so that a party suffers 
no disadvantage therefrom he is precluded 
from complaining about it." 
The opinion then cites the case of Taylor v. E, M. Royle Corp., 
-11-
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No- 8028, 1 U2d 175, 264 P2d 279 (1953), and Morris v. Russell, 
120 U 545, 236 P2d 451 and Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P. 
A reading of the Morris case will reveal that the 
plaintiff pleaded a case of express contract and quantum meruit. 
During the trial, the Court struck the latter claim from the 
pleadings on the Motion of the defendant, then the next day 
on Motion of the plaintiff reinstated the claim. On appeal, 
this Court held that the defendant had not been prejudiced because 
it had notice of the claim and the granting of a motion reinstating 
said claim was well within the discretionary powers of the Trial 
Court to prevent technical errors from prejudicing the claim of 
a party. 
In the Taylor case, the plaintiff had pleaded an 
express contract; however, no claim of quantum meruit or contract 
implied in law, was pleaded. The Trial Court rendered a 
Judgment in part based upon an express contract and in part 
upon a contract implied in law. The question on appeal to this 
Court was whether or not under the then new Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure could the plaintiff have such a Judgment when he had 
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not pleaded such a theory, and sought no amendment to his 
pleadings. This Court, after distinguishing the facts and 
holding in Morris reversed that part of the Judgment of the 
Trial Court based upon a contract implied in law, saying: 
; "It is true that our new rules should be ... .. 
'liberally construed1 to secure a fjust . . . ' 
determination of every action,' but they 
do not represent a one-way street down which 
but one litigant may travel. . . . they (the 
rules) allow plaintiffs considerable latitude 
. in pleading and proof, to the point where • .-.-
some people have expressed the opinion that 
careless legal craftmanship has been invited 
rather than discouraged. Be that as it may, a 
defendant must be extended every reasonable 
opportunity to prepare his case and to meet an 
adversary's claims. As he must be protected 
against surprise and be assured equal opportunity 
and facility to present and prove counter 
contentions - else unilateral justice and 
injustice would result sufficient to raise 
serious doubts as to constitutional due 
process." (emphasis added) 
No mention is made in either of the cited cases of any 
requirement of the defendant in such a situation to request 
additional time in which to prepare for a claim made. It is 
submitted that it should not be required of a litigant to make 
such a request unless a Motion to Amend is made and granted by 
the Trial Court, which was never done in the instant case. 
-13-
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The concern which appellant has is that the Taylor 
case cited in the opinion held precisely contrary to the 
proposition for which it is cited; that is, the Taylor decision 
held that even though the then "new rules" should be liberally 
construed they would not be so construed when to do so would 
deprive a party of due process of law. In that case, the Court 
reversed that part of a Judgment based upon an implied in law 
contract not pleaded. Likewise, in the instant case, a claim of 
breach of warranty for fitness for a particular use and fraud 
were pleaded containing far different legal issues and some 
different factual issues than., a claim for breach of warranty 
of merchantibility. The Trial Court submitted the issues of 
fraud and the unpleaded theory of merchantibility to the jury 
over the objection of defendant, Larson Ford. If the opinion 
in this case is to be consistent, the Taylor case must be 
distinguished, overruled, or the opinion decided consistently 
with the principle announced in Taylor and a ruling must be made 
that the Trial Court erred in submitting the issue of 
merchantibility to the jury. 
Rule 15 (b) , U.R.C.P., provides that a party may amend 
his pleadings to conform to the evidence where an issue not 
-14-
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included in the pleadings was tried with the express or implied 
consent of the parties. 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs pleaded fraud 
and breach of warranty of fitness for a particular use. Of 
necessity, the evidence upon both issues tended to show that the 
performance of the motor home sold the plaintiffs did not live 
up to the express statements made regarding the performance 
of the motor home. It was impossible for the defendant to know 
or be apprised that any of such evidence was being presented 
for the purpose of a claim of breach of warranty of merchantibility 
rather than the pleaded claims. Therefore, a consent cannot be 
implied from the trial record. 
II 
' ISSUES AS TO FRAUD : " ' ~ 
^ The facts of the conversation between Jon Larson and 
the Christophers set out in the opinion are lifted verbatim 
from the Complaint of plaintiffs and is not an accurate statement 
of thos facts as they appear in the record. The verbatim evidence 
-15-
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of those conversations as it appears in the record are as 
follows: 
"Q Mr. Christopher, you have to tell us what you 
said to him, not just the conclusion what you needed 
but what did you tell him about what you needed? 
A We told him we needed a machine large enough 
to bed down or have a bed for ten boys because this 
was Robin!s intention to take these boys and he 
needed that large a machine. Jon assured us it 
would have room for ten boys and we could see it 
would. We were in it and it looked real nice. It 
is beautiful inside, and in our over-stipulation, 
we were very emphatic on this: 'Now, Mr. Larson, 
we have to pull another machine because in Robin's 
business he will have to have his car with him to 
move around the cities and because the Condor would 
' be too large to park and we would have to have 
another — to pull his car.1 Mr. Larson assured 
us that it would." (R. 396-397) 
"Q (By Mr. King) Tell us what he said to you 
now on that occasion? 
A He said it would easily pull a trailer, that 
they had on other instances. And he specified one 
and told us the man's name who had a Condor and it 
was supposed to be identical. We didn't check this 
out. He said this fellow pulled horses. He pulled 
a big horse trailer, I believe, he said with four 
horses in it and had no problem. He said, 'You 
' won't even know it is behind you.'" (R. 397 L20-28) 
"A Yes, sir. We had the conversation on the 
Condor and we were asking about the facilities within 
it. And if it was big enough for the use that it was 
going to be used in. And he told us, Yes, it would 
-16-
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be and, in fact, John Wayne even owned one of these 
machines. I told him that we needed to pull a car 
behind it. He said, 'That is no problem.1 He said, 
'We even sell these to one that pulls horse trailers 
behind it with horses in it.1 And the question came 
up that it was a 1970 machine and Mr. Larson said, 
:'.-'-;' 'No, this is a brand new machine. We have only 
used this as a demonstrator.1 And, in fact, my dad 
noticed the mileage on the audiometer and it was 
over 7,000 miles. And he mentioned this and Mr. 
Larson says, 'That is nothing.'- He says, 'We just 
had a brand new engine put in this machine.' He 
said, 'We came up from barstow and the engine blew 
out.' And my dad said, 'Well, what is going to 
keep it from making the engine blow out again?' He 
said, 'That is a brand new engine and that was just 
a freak that was put in there and that is the reason 
it happened.' He told us it was a brand new machine 
and it also had new furnishings on the inside of it. 
And so through that guaranty, we could understand 
we were actually buying a brand new machine and not 
a used one." (R. 497 L14) 
The opinion as to fraud simply ignores the issues 
raised in the defendant's brief because of some believed, "conflict 
in the evidence." Essentially, there was no conflict in the 
evidence as to the statements made by Jon Larson with respect to 
the motor home. They are set forth above verbatim from the record. 
Such statements have never been construed as fraud by a Utah Court 
under the circumstances here, and as a matter of fact, have been 
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held as a matter of law not to be fraud in the case of Pace v. 
Parrish cited in the opinion of this Court. For the Court to 
now say that such statements are fraudulent under the circum-
stances here, without expressly overruling some sixty years of 
decisions on fraud is the same as making a special rule in such 
cases as are here presented without giving.or making any valid 
distinctions for so doing. ; \ 
There was never any showing that Jon Larson knew or 
should have known that any statement which he made to the 
Christophers was false, or that the statements were anything 
but puffing. As to any statements made after the contract to 
purchase had already been signed, it could hardly be said that 
there was any reliance upon such a statement other than the 
payment of $975.00 which Christopher, by the terms of the contract, 
was already required to pay. There was no evidence introduced 
to show what Larson meant by the statement, "Bring it back" — 
Bring it back for what? To be repaired or cured? To be replaced? 
Such a statement is so vague that no fraud could or should be 
predicated upon it, for it is impossible to define its meaning. 
-18-
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Further, there was no showing that it was false, or that Larson 
knew or should have known that it was false. 
. ..';••' '•..••;::* • . ' I 1 1 -
EXCLUSION OF WARRANTY 
The citation of the Sellman Auto, Inc. v. McCowan case 
in the opinion for the proposition that provisions on the reverse 
side of a contract are not binding even though called to the 
attention of the signer of the document on the face of the document 
is completely erroneous because said case was decided under the 
Uniform Sales Act which was repealed in Nevada in 1965 and 
repealed in Utah in 1966, and not a part of the substantive law 
of the State of Utah applicable to the instant transaction. 
The opinion then requires a showing that the exclusionary 
provisions were called to the attention of Christopher before they 
are effective, when such a requirement never has been a require-
ment under the Uniform Commercial Code. .Rather, the standard 
is whether or not the provision would have been seen by a reasonable 
man (see Section 70A-1-201 (10) U.C.A. 1953 as amended cited in 
appellant's brief). The net effect of such a decision is blatant 
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judicial legislation on this question and the imposition of a 
different standard than our own substantive law requires. .„.-.. 
The opinion then completely ignores the question of 
whether Larson's attention was ever drawn to the warranty limi-
tations of 2 years or 12,00.0. jniles which were contained in one 
page of a warranty book which was approximately two inches 
thick, never signed by any of the parties, and placed in a 
cupboard somewhere in the motor home. It is obvious that such 
a document was not a document of sale and was never called to 
Larson's attention nor would a reasonable man be aware of it* 
How then, can this opinion be consistent in any respect when it 
applies one principle of law to one party and completely ignores 
the same principle as to a sale transaction to two parties in the 
same lawsuit selling the same item? Such a construction has the 
effect of taking a constitutional enactment of our legislation 
and construing it in a way which violates Article 1, section 24 
of the Utah Constitution that all laws of a general nature shall 
have a uniform operation. .-...-.-. ,
 ; ...•:..; 
- . I V ::•: , , . . '• ••:.,:.-
DISMISSAL AS A MATTER OF LAW OF CROSS CLAIM AGAINST 
CONDOR 
The opinion further affirms a statement by the Trial 
Court which essentially said that the mere passage of time and 
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the driving of the unit of 7,800 miles would void any warranty of 
merchantibility as to Condor. The Trial Court as well as this 
Court has missed the point as shown by the facts set out in the 
opinion. What were the defects? From the opinion they were as 
follows: 
1. Solenoid located too close to the exhaust manifold 
Causing the solenoid to overheat resulting in 
difficulty in starting. 
2. Power train to small for the load it was to carry. 
3. Excessive howling caused by a defect in the 
differential (mismatched gears). 
4. Difficulty in getting gasoline from the tank to 
the auxiliary motor. 
5. The transmission kicked down when it got hot. 
As pointed out in the appellant's brief on appeal, at 
no time did Mr. Has lam testify that any of these atems were caused 
by driving the unit 7,800 miles or the passage of two years in 
time. In fact, it is clear from the tecord that the location of 
the solenoid, the size of the power train, and the excessive 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
howling in the differential were all conditions which, if they 
existed at all, existed and were the same on the day the vehicle 
was delivered from the manufacturer to the dealer as they were 
when the vehicle was sold to the Christophers. 
It is an elementary precept of law which dictates that 
any question of fact upon which reasonable minds can differ must 
be submitted to the jury. In this case, the Trial Court as well 
as this Court on appeal has substituted its judgment on a question 
of fact for that of the jury which sat on the case. Neither this 
Court nor the Trial Court in all of their collective wisdom, should 
set themselves up as experts in the arsa of automotive or vehicular 
malfunctions and the causes thereof, but this is the net effect 
of the decision by the Trial Court and this Court, to dismiss the 
Third Party Claim against Condor before being submitted to the jury. 
There is an obvious confusion by the Trial Court and 
this Court in the legal question which was and is involved in this 
case. This confusion is shown by the statement, 
" . . . you can't say that two years later, 
7,800 miles later . . . that Condor can be 
held to say that when Larson Motor sells 
that to the Christophers that Condor is still 
warranting that the vehicle is merchantible . . .Jf 
It was the contention of Larson that if the defects 
of which the Christophers complained in fact existed, they were 
-22-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
caused by the manufacturer and existed at the time of sale from 
Condor to Larson. What this Court as well as the Trial Court is 
saying is that the Trial Court has the expertise without benefit 
of any aid of witnesses to say that as a matter of law the driving 
of a vehicle a mere 7,800 miles and the passage of two years 
caused changes in the following conditions: 
1. The location of the solenoid in relationship to 
the exhaust manifold. 
2. Change in size of the power train in excess of 
what any person would expect by the passage of 
two years or driving 7,800 miles. 
3. Excessive howling in the differential. 
It is submitted that the qualifications required of our 
judiciary and the experience all judges undergo on the bench is 
not sufficient to allow them to make the foregoing decision to 
substantially affect the rights of litigants without testimony 
directly bearing on such a subject. Therefore, these issues should 
have been submitted to the jury for a decision as to whether the 
defects alleged by Christopher existed in the motor at the date 
of delivery to Larson. 
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• ,..;• .- C O N C L U S I O N ... ...
 : . ... 
This Court has improperly applied the existing Utah law 
as to pleading, notice and due process of law, as to the Uniform 
Commercial Code, as to fraud and the submission of factual questions 
to a jury in order,to affirm a Trial Court decision. Such is not 
and never should be the state of the law in this jurisdiction. 
A rehearing of this matter should be had to correct the application 
of law in this case. ,.-_ ;.::,:; •  . ..: •• u ; . : 
._• ..... .. _; ...-.;?... . Respectfully Submitted, 
- , . ;•:•.;. JOHN L. McCOY -
,, ,.. . ,..-, .Attorney for Appellant 
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